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Abstract. This paper re-studies the security of an MPEG-video encryp-
tion scheme based on secret Huffman tables. The present cryptanalysis
shows that: 1) the key space of the encryption scheme is not sufficiently
large against divide-and-conquer (DAC) ciphertext-only attack; 2) its se-
curity against the chosen-plaintext attack is very weak. The insecurity
is mainly due to the separated use of different Huffman tables for differ-
ent sets of syntax elements. A brief discussion on how to improve this
MPEG-video encryption scheme is also given.
1 Introduction
The extensive use of digital images and video in today’s digital world makes the
security and privacy issues become more important. To fulfill such an increasing
demand, various encryption algorithms have been proposed in recent years as
possible solutions to content protection of digital images and video [1–10], among
which MPEG video attracts special attention due to its prominent prevalence in
consumer electronic markets [11–13]. As an important way of designing MPEG-
video encryption schemes, secret Huffman tables have been suggested in some
designs [2, 7, 14–18].
The MPEG-video encryption scheme proposed in [14] (i.e., Algorithm 1
in [2]) is a light-weight scheme, which encrypts the plain-video by shuﬄing VLC
(variable-length coding) entries of same size in each Huffman table. However,
because the bit length of each VLC codeword does not change, the position of
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each VLC codeword in the video stream does not change either. Thus, an at-
tacker can uniquely locate (and thus determine) all VLC codewords contained
in the cipher-video stream, if the plain-video stream or an independent part
(such as a picture or a slice) is known. Once all distinct VLC codewords are
obtained, the whole secret Huffman table is uniquely reconstructed and the en-
cryption scheme is broken. That is, this light-weight scheme is not secure against
known/chosen-plaintext attacks. In addition, as pointed out in [2], the key space
of this encryption scheme is very limited (especially for Huffman tables with a
small number of VLC entries), so even a brute-force attack may be feasible.
The MPEG-video encryption scheme proposed in [15] can be considered as
an enhanced version of that in [14]. In this scheme, five different Huffman tables
are shuﬄed separatedly and the shuﬄing operations are generalized to work on
VLC entries with different sizes, in the hope that the key space can be enlarged
and the security against plaintext attacks can be improved. Furthermore, as a
second guard on the security, random bit flipping operations are also introduced
to further encrypt each secret Huffman table.
In [7, 16–18], multiple Huffman tables (MHT) are introduced, from which
one table is secretly chosen for the encryption of each VLC codeword. A so-
called “Huffman tree mutation process” is also proposed in [7, 16, 17] to derive
more candidate Huffman tables from several original tables. Some cryptanalysis
results about known-plaintext attacks have been reported recently [19,20].
This paper mainly focuses on some security problems with the MPEG-video
encryption scheme proposed in [15]. Our cryptanalysis shows that this scheme is
not sufficiently secure against DAC (divide-and-conquer) ciphertext-only attack
and very weak against chosen-plaintext attack.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, a brief
introduction to the MPEG-video encryption scheme under study is given. Then,
the cryptanalysis results are presented in detail in Sec. 3. Finally, Section 4 gives
a brief discussion on how to improve the security of the MPEG-video encryption
scheme, and the last section concludes this paper.
2 MPEG-Video Encryption Scheme Under Study
In MPEG-1/2 standards, Huffman coding is used to realize lossless compression
of quantized DCT coefficients. Each Huffman tree is represented as a 1-D Huff-
man table, which transforms an input value into a VLC codeword. There are in
total 15 Huffman tables used in MPEG-2 standard [12] (less in MPEG-1 stan-
dard [11]), among which 10 ones (Tables B-1 to B-9) are used for coding syntax
elements in various headers and the following six ones are for visual information
– DCT coefficients in each block and motion vectors in each macroblock:
– Table B-10: for encoding motion vectors;
– Table B-11 (not used in MPEG-1 standard): for encoding the differential
motion vectors of the dual prime prediction;
– Table B-12: for encoding the bit size of the differential values of DC coeffi-
cients in intra luminance blocks;
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– Table B-13: for encoding the bit size of the differential values of DC coeffi-
cients in intra chrominance blocks;
– Table B-14: for encoding all DCT coefficients of non-intra blocks and AC co-
efficients of intra blocks with intra vlc format = 0, where intra vlc format
is a picture-specific flag defined in MPEG-2 standard (which does not exist
for MPEG-1 video and the value shall be taken as 0);
– Table B-15 (not used in MPEG-1 standard): for encoding all AC coefficients
of intra blocks with intra vlc format = 1.
The encryption scheme proposed in [15] is designed by concealing the original
Huffman tables, i.e., using different (secret) Huffman tables to replace the orig-
inal ones. Five Huffman tables used for coding visual information, B-10, B-12,
B-13, B-14 and B-15, are chosen to be kept secret. Table B-11 is not selected,
since it is only a very small Huffman table with three entries. The five secret
Huffman tables are derived from the original ones by performing the following
two encryption operations.
– Shuﬄing VLC codewords: grouping all VLC codewords into several sub-
sets according to their bit sizes, and then randomly shuﬄing these VLC
codewords within each sub-set.
– Random bit flipping : randomly flipping the last bit of each VLC codeword,
and adjusting (if needed) other VLC codewords to keep the prefix rule valid.
After encrypting all the five Huffman tables, the bit sizes of some (at least one)
VLC codewords should be slightly changed to resist known-plaintext attacks (as
discussed in Sec. 1 of this paper), but the change should not be too much to
avoid a large influence on compression efficiency.
In [15], the key space was estimated by enumerating all “good” encryption
methods6 of shuﬄing and random bit flipping operations carried out on some
selected significant (not all) VLC codewords, as shown in Table 1. As a result of
the large key space, the scheme was considered sufficiently secure.
Table 1. Number of good encryption methods of each Huffman table (Table 3.6 of [15]).
Huffman table Number of good encryption methods
B-10 3!
B-12 7!× 26
B-13 6!× 28
B-14 6!
B-15 16!
Total (3!)× `7!× 26´× `6!× 28´× (6!)× (16!) ≈ 292
In [15], an additional measure is suggested to further enhance the security
against plaintext attacks – reshuﬄing the Huffman tables after a certain number
6 An encryption method is “good” if it can produce unintelligible images.
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of frames. In the following, we will mainly consider the basic scheme without the
reshuﬄing mechanism. The effect of the reshuﬄing mechanism will be discussed
later in Sec. 4.
3 Cryptanalysis
In this section, the security of the aforementioned MPEG-video encryption scheme
based on secret Huffman tables is reconsidered, and it is found that the scheme
is not so secure as evaluated in [15]. In this section, the terms and notations
in MPEG-2 standard [12] will be used, except those only existing in MPEG-
1 video. The following terms are used throughout this section to facilitate the
description: 1) the term “picture” is used instead of “frame”, since the encryp-
tion scheme is independent of the syntactic differences between a picture and a
frame; 2) macroblock is abbreviated as “MB”; 3) the term “MB header” is used
to denote the set of all syntax elements occurring before the first encoded block
in an MB (if none of the blocks is coded, the MB header is the MB itself).
3.1 Ciphertext-only attack
The ciphertext-only attack is the most common attack in practice, since in gen-
eral the communication channels are open to the public, which means that an
attacker can observe as many ciphertexts as possible and then use them to break
an encryption scheme [21]. There are two different goals in a ciphertext-only at-
tack: recovering the plaintexts and recovering the secret key. This paper mainly
focuses on the recovery of the secret key, i.e., the secret Huffman tables in the
MPEG-video encryption scheme under study.
The simplest ciphertext-only attack is to exhaustively search all possible
keys to find the unique correct one (or an equivalent key), which is called brute-
force attack [21]. Here, a criterion is needed to verify each searched key. For the
MPEG-video encryption scheme under study, the occurrence of syntax errors
can serve as such a criterion for detecting wrong keys. When a wrong Huffman
table is used to decode a cipher-picture, syntax errors may occur in the decoding
procedure due to (but not limited to) the following reasons.
– As mentioned in Sec. 1, to ensure the security against plaintext attacks,
there should be at least two distinct bit sizes for each input value in a
Huffman table. However, once the bit size of a VLC codeword is wrong, all
the following syntax elements in the current slice cannot be correctly located
and decoded.
– For each Huffman table, not all FLC codewords of a specific bit size are valid
VLC codewords.
– All stuffing bits at the end of a slice should be zero bits.
– There may exist some marker bits (must be “1” to avoid “start code emula-
tion”, i.e., the occurrence of fake start codes) in the bit stream:
• (for MPEG-2 video only) when concealment motion vectors = 1 in an
intra-block, there exists a marker bit in the MB header;
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• (for MPEG-1 video only) in D-picture, the last bit of each MB must be
a marker bit named end of macroblock.
– There exist some constraints on the decoded syntax elements:
• each decoded DCT coefficient should not be out of the range [−2048,+2047];
• each decoded motion vector should not be out of the range defined in
Table 7-8 of the MPEG-2 standard [12], and must be within the reference
picture after adding the coordinates of the predicted MB.
– There must be an EOB VLC codeword at the end of each block, before which
the total number of decoded DCT coefficients must not be greater than 64.
– The number of MBs within each picture should not be greater than a max-
imal value.
– Some slice headers may be skipped when the video is decoded with wrong
Huffman tables, which is forbidden for some video sequences (for example,
an MPEG-1/2 video stream with a restricted slice structure).
By detecting syntax errors occurring in the decoding procedure, one can dis-
tinguish most wrong Huffman tables. In addition, there exist a lot of information
redundancies in decoded video. Therefore, even when no syntax error is detected,
one can still distinguish a wrong Huffman table if there exist too many abrupt
changes around the borders of adjacent blocks. Finally, note that if no syntax
error is found for a wrong key, then this wrong key tends to be an equivalent
key to decrypt the cipher-video (or some part of the cipher-video), which hap-
pens when some VLC codewords are not involved in the encoding process of the
plain-video or part of it.
Because the five Huffman tables are used for different sets of syntax elements
of the whole video bit-stream, it is possible to separatedly guess them one by one.
This means that one can use the so-called divide-and-conquer (DAC) attack [21]
to break the MPEG-video encryption scheme. In other words, the key space of
the encryption scheme will be the sum, not the product, of the sub-key-spaces
of the five tables. Next, let us see how to separatedly break the five Huffman
tables by detecting syntax errors in the video decoding procedure.
Reconstructing Table B-10 Following the MPEG-2 standard, Tables B-
12/13/14/15 are all independent of the decoding of the first MB header in a
slice7, which makes the separated reconstruction of Table B-10 possible. When a
wrong Table B-10 is used, the following syntax errors may occur when the first
MB header of a slice is decoded.
– Some decoded motion vectors may be invalid, especially for those MBs near
the picture edge.
– When concealment motion vectors = 1 in an intra-block, the marker bit in
the MB will be wrong (i.e., equal to 0) with a probability of 0.5 (under the
assumption that each bit in the video stream is distributed uniformly) and
then a fake start code might also occur.
7 All other MBs cannot be located without knowing Tables B-12/13/14/15.
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– Whenmacroblock pattern = 1, “0000 0000 0” never occurs in coded block pattern
encoded by Table B-9.
Since in each slice only the first MB header can be used to detect syntax errors
about Table B-10, the average number of involved syntax elements may be too
small, especially for pictures with a small number of slices and/or slow motion.
Under such a condition, one has to exhaustively search for Table B-10 and Table
B-14 together such that all motion vectors can be used.
Reconstructing Table B-14 Since all DCT coefficients in a non-intra MB are
encoded with Table B-14, syntax errors may occur when a wrong Table B-14
is used to decode a non-intra MB. Considering most MBs in a P/B-picture are
non-intra MBs, the occurrence probability of such errors will be relatively high.
To test how frequently syntax errors of this kind occur in real attacks, we
observed the decoding process by exchanging the following two VLC codewords
in Table B-14 – “00101” and “000110”, which represent RLE codewords (0,3)
and (1,2), respectively8. For a large number of test MPEG-1/2 video files, syntax
errors all occurred in the first P-picture (i.e., the 2nd picture of the whole video).
Figure 1 shows the results for an MPEG-1 video “Carphone” (of size 176× 144)
and an MPEG-2 video “Tennis” (of size 704× 576), where the pink areas (light
grey areas on the printed version of the paper) in the decoded pictures denote
decoding failures caused by syntax errors (the same hereinafter). Note that all
the pictures are displayed as raw data (i.e., the differential pictures) since the
reference I-pictures are still unknown at this stage of attack. If the whole Huffman
table is heavily shuﬄed, syntax errors will definitely occur more frequently.
a) b) c) d)
Fig. 1. The decoded results of an MPEG-1 video “Carphone” and an MPEG-2 video
“Tennis”, when only two VLC codewords were exchanged in Table B-14: a) the 2nd
picture of “Carphone”; b) the decoded 2nd picture of “Carphone”; c) the 2nd picture
of “Tennis”; d) the decoded 2nd picture of “Tennis”.
Reconstructing Table B-12 Once Table B-14 is reconstructed, Table B-12 can
be further exhaustively searched for in intra MBs with intra vlc format = 0. If
8 These two VLC codewords were taken from the “good” VLC codewords selected by
the authors of [15] to shuﬄe the corresponding Huffman table. The same rule also
applies to other experiments in this paper.
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all intra MBs in all known plain-video are encoded with intra vlc format = 1,
Table B-12 has to be exhaustively searched for together with Table B-15 (see
below), which is generally a rare event when an attacker can collect a number
of cipher-pictures to carry out the ciphertext-only attack.
In the case that only two VLC codewords, “00” and “01”, in Table B-12 were
swapped, we tested the decoding results for some MPEG-1/2 video files. Two
results are shown in Fig. 2. Note that the swapped VLC codewords have the
same bit size, so a stronger shuﬄing shall cause much more syntax errors.
a) b) c) d)
Fig. 2. The decoded results of the MPEG-1 video “Carphone” and the MPEG-2 video
“Tennis”, when only two VLC codewords were exchanged in Table B-12: a) the 1st
picture of “Carphone”; b) the decoded 1st picture of “Carphone”; c) the 1st picture of
“Tennis”; d) the decoded 1st picture of “Tennis”.
Reconstructing Table B-15 If Table B-12 has been successfully guessed,
Table B-15 can be exhaustively searched for in luminance blocks of intra MBs
with intra vlc format = 1, just like the case of reconstructing Table B-14. If
Table B-12 cannot be separatedly broken, Tables B-12 and B-15 have to be
exhaustively searched for together.
By swapping two VLC codewords “00101” and “000110”, which represent
RLE codewords (2,1) and (4,1), respectively, in Table B-15, we tested the de-
coding results of some MPEG-2 video files (note that this table is not used in the
MPEG-1 standard). Figure 3 gives one result for the MPEG-2 video “Tennis”.
a) b)
Fig. 3. The decoded result of the MPEG-2 video “Tennis”, when only two VLC code-
words were exchanged in Table B-15: a) the 1st picture of the original video; b) the
decoded 1st picture.
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Reconstructing Table B-13 After Tables B-12, 14 and 15 are broken, Table
B-13 can be exhaustively searched for in chrominance blocks of intra MBs. If
there are intra MBs with intra vlc format = 0, Table B-13 can be exhaustively
broken immediately after Table B-14 is broken, without knowing Table B-15.
By exchanging two VLC codewords, “01” and “10”, in Table B-13, we tested
the decoding results of some MPEG-1/2 video files. The results corresponding
to the MPEG-1 video “Carphone” and the MPEG-2 video “Tennis” are shown
in Fig. 4. Once again, many syntax errors can be observed.
a) b) c) d)
Fig. 4. The decoded results of the MPEG-1 video “Carphone” and the MPEG-2 video
“Tennis”, when only two VLC codewords were exchanged in Table B-13: a) the 1st
picture of “Carphone”; b) the decoded 1st picture of “Carphone”; c) the 1st picture of
“Tennis”; d) the decoded 1st picture of “Tennis”.
Finally, based on the above analysis, we can estimate the complexity of the
DAC attack under four different conditions as follows:
– when Table B-10 is separatedly searched for :
• when Table B-12 is separatedly searched for : (3!)+ (7!×26)+ (6!×28)+
(6!) + (16!) ≈ 244.3;
• when Table B-12 is searched for together with Table B-15 : (3!) + (7! ×
26)× (16!) + (6!× 28) + (6!) ≈ 262.5;
– when Table B-10 is not separatedly searched for :
• when Table B-12 is separatedly searched for : (3!)× (6!)+(7!×26)+(6!×
28) + (16!) ≈ 244.3;
• when Table B-12 is searched for together with Table B-15 : (3!) × (6!) +
(7!× 26)× (16!) + (6!× 28) ≈ 262.5.
One can see that in all cases the complexity is much smaller than the one esti-
mated in [15]: (3!)× (7!× 26)× (6!× 28)× (6!)× (16!) ≈ 292.
As long as a VLC codeword appears frequently, syntax errors caused by
encrypting it will occur with a high probability, which means that this VLC
codeword will be reconstructed easily (i.e., wrong guesses of the VLC codeword
can always be recognized). On the other hand, if a VLC codeword does not
appear very frequently such that syntax errors do not occur for a given MPEG-
video, the performance of encrypting this VLC codeword will not be “good”
enough, so it should not be included in the key. In other words, a “good” key for
encryption performance actually means a “bad” key that can be easily guessed
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with the DAC brute-force attack. Therefore, the efficiency of the DAC attack is
ensured in a natural way. In addition, as shown in our experiments, only a few
number of cipher-pictures (or even a few number of slices) would be enough to
carry out the above DAC attack effectively.
3.2 Chosen-plaintext attack
The chosen-plaintext attack is a very strong attack, in which one can (inten-
tionally) choose some plaintexts and observe the corresponding ciphertexts to
break an encryption scheme [21]. With the help of some chosen plaintexts and
ciphertexts, it is possible to directly determine the secret Huffman tables with-
out exhaustively guessing them in all possible candidates. In the following, we
show how to choose a few number of plain-MBs to carry out a successful chosen-
plaintext attack.
Reconstructing Table B-10 Choose a P-picture, in which there are a number
of consecutive slices that contains only one “Not Coded” non-intra MB. In this
case, there will be only one slice header and one MB header in each slice. Then,
one can easily locate the only MB header in each slice, and extract a bit segment
composed of two motion vectors from the MB header. In the extracted bit seg-
ment, the values ofmotion residuals, dmvectors, and the sign bits of the motion
vectors can be chosen to uniquely distinguish each motion code, i.e., each VLC
codeword encoded with the secret Table B-10. If necessary, f code[r][s] can also
be intentionally chosen to help the extraction of the VLC encodedmotion codes.
By choosing the values of n consecutive motion codes to be the n values cor-
responding to unknown VLC codewords, the whole secret Table B-10 can be
reconstructed. Since n = 3 for the secret Table B-10 under study and each MB
in a P-picture has two motion vectors, only 2 MBs (in 2 slices) are needed for
this purpose. If a B-picture is chosen, then 1 MB is enough since there can be
four motion vectors.
Reconstructing Table B-14 After reconstructing Table B-10, one can con-
tinue to break Table B-14 by choosing a block in a non-intra MB with the fol-
lowing pattern: “(run1, level1), (rune, levele), · · · , (runi, leveli), (rune, levele),
· · · , EOB” where (runi, leveli) is the i-th entry in the secret Table B-14 and
(rune, levele) is an Escape RLE codeword. By choosing (rune, levele) properly,
one can easily recognize each VLC codeword corresponding to the RLE codeword
(runi, leveli). If a single block cannot contain all the encrypted VLC codewords,
one more block can be chosen. For the encryption scheme under study, all the 6
encrypted VLC codewords in Table B-14 can be put in the same block, so only
one chosen-block in a single non-intra MB is enough. Note that this table can
also be broken in a similar way by choosing one intra blocks, after Tables B-12
and B-13 are firstly recovered as described in next paragraph.
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Reconstructing Tables B-12/13 Since AC coefficients of intra-blocks are
encoded in a similar way to the motion vectors, the method of reconstructing
Table B-10 can also be used to break Tables B-12 and B-13. To break the entry
corresponding to dct dc size = s, choose an intra-block as follows: “level, EOB”,
where the DC coefficient level has s significant bits. Then, the video bitstream
corresponding to this block will be “dct dc size, dc dct differential, EOB”. Since
EOB and dc dct differential are both known, it is easy to determine the VLC
encoded dct dc size. Given 7 luminance blocks with different values of s, all the
7 encrypted VLC codewords in Table B-12 can be reconstructed. Similarly, given
6 chrominance blocks, Table B-13 can be completely reconstructed. According
to the value of chroma format, the maximal numbers of required chosen intra
MBs for reconstructing Tables B-12 and 13 are 2 and 3, respectively. Since an
MB can include both luminance and chrominance blocks, at most 3 intra MBs
are needed to break the two secret Huffman tables.
Reconstructing Table B-15 After reconstructing Tables B-12 and B-13, one
can break Table B-15 by choosing some intra-blocks, in the same way of re-
constructing Table B-14. The 16 encrypted VLC codewords in Table B-15 and
the RLE codewords used as locators can not be included in a single block, but
two blocks in one intra MB are enough to reconstruct all the encrypted VLC
codewords.
As a whole, to completely reconstruct all the secret Huffman table, at most
4 intra MBs in an I-picture and 3 non-intra MBs in a P-picture (or 2 non-intra
MBs in a B-picture) are needed. While two chosen pictures are needed to break
all the secret Huffman tables, note that not all the five Huffman tables are used
for a single picture. For example, for an I-picture, Table B-10 is not used, and
for a P- or B-picture, most blocks are non-intra coded without Tables B-12 and
B-13. This implies that only one chosen picture is enough to recover all secret
Huffman tables needed for decoding the same type of pictures (and part of other
types of pictures). So the MPEG-video encryption scheme is very weak against
chosen-plaintext attack.
4 More Discussions
In this section, a brief discussion is given on how to improve the security of the
MPEG video encryption scheme under study. A simple measure is to change the
secret Huffman tables frequently. In [15], it was suggested to reshuﬄe them after
certain number of frames. Generally speaking, these reshuﬄing operations might
be enough to provide an acceptable resistance against ciphertext-only attack.
However, even reshuﬄing these Huffman tables frame by frame is generally not
sufficient for the security against the above chosen-plaintext attack, since a few
number of MBs may be enough to break the secret Huffman tables. From the
most conservative point of view, one has to reshuﬄe the Huffman tables for each
VLC codeword. Such a heavy reshuﬄing process will dramatically reduce the
speed of the whole system and become impractical in many real applications.
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Another possible solution is to use multiple Huffman tables (MHT) as sug-
gested in [7, 16–18]. While some configurations of MHT encryption have been
known insecure [19, 20], the following one remains secure: a stream cipher (or a
secure PRNG) is adopted to determine the secret Huffman table from multiple
candidate tables for each VLC codeword. However, as is well known in cryptol-
ogy, a stream cipher is not secure against plaintext attacks if the key is reused
to encrypt more than two plain messages. Thus, in real applications, to guar-
antee the security against plaintext attacks, some practical measures must be
adopted to avoid reuse of the same key for different plaintexts, such as using a
key-management system to assign a different key for different encryption session.
Though using a stream cipher with MHT might be able to ensure the security
against plaintext attack in practice, its performance could be worse than simply
using the same stream cipher to mask the video bitstream. Assume that the
number of different Huffman tables is 256 and the output of the stream cipher
is a sequence of 8-bit integers. In this case, because the average bit size of VLC
codewords is less than 8, more than one iterations of the stream cipher are
required for encryption of each plain-byte. As a comparison, if the stream cipher’s
output is directly used to mask the video bitstream, only one iteration of the
stream cipher is needed for each plain-byte. It needs more further research to see
if there exist some other possibilities to enhance the performance of MHT-based
secure Huffman coding algorithms.
5 Conclusions
This paper has re-analyzed the security of an MPEG-video encryption scheme
based on secret Huffman tables. It is found that the scheme is not sufficiently se-
cure against divide-and-conquer ciphertext-only attack, and is very weak against
the chosen-plaintext attack. A brief discussion has also been given on how to im-
prove the security of the MPEG-video encryption scheme.
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